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Comment
ELECTRONIC FUNDS TRANSFER AND BRANCH
BANKING -

THE APPLICATION OF OLD

LAW TO NEW TECHNOLOGY
The transformation to automated banking services made possible by
the application of computer technology to bank-customer operations is
causing a concomitant need for change in banking law. The pressures for
technological change are clear: the present payments mechanism in the
United States is generating a steadily increasing volume of paper;' savings
may be realized by financial institutions that replace at least some manual
and mechanical operations with electronic payments services; innovative
banking executives wish to offer new services to their customers unhindered by statutes they view as antiquated and overly restrictive.2
In response to these emerging changes in the payments mechanism
are new federal regulations permitting the use of place-of-business (p-o-b)
payments systems by various financial intermediaries. 3 For example, a
1. More than thirty billion transactions are now made annually in the United
States by check. Lindsey, Consumers Test Electronic Banking, N.Y. Times, Apr. 6,
1975, § 3, at 1, col. 7.
2. Brandel & Gresham, Electronic Payments: Government Intervention or Neu,
Frontier for Private Initiative, 29 Bus. LAW. 1133 (1974).
3. A p-o-b system consists of a terminal, installed in some location remote from
the bank, that is connected by wire to the institution's central accounts computer.
The terminal permits a bank customer to engage in a financial transaction with
his bank, typically resulting in a crediting of funds to the customer's account, a cash
withdrawal from his account, a transfer between his savings and checking accounts,
or perhaps a payment transfer from his account to an account maintained by another
bank customer.
Manned and unmanned terminals are currently in use. Unmanned terminals
such as the now familiar automated teller machine, see note 42 infra, may be under
the control of either the bank or a third party; however, involvement of a third party
usually relates only to ownership and maintenance of the terminal, and the third
party is neither directly nor financially involved in transactions between the bank
and its customers. Those manned p-o-b terminals presently in use involve a third
party in addition to the bank and its customer. In the typical operation of this type
of system, the terminal is located in a retail establishment where it is manned by a
store employee. Transactions involving the receipt of funds for deposit or cash withdrawals are first verified by the retail employee and are then debited or credited to an
account maintained by the commercial establishment with the same bank, thereby
making the store both a financial and functional intermediary between the bank and
its customer. 39 Fed. Reg. 44421-22 (1974).
The system currently employed by First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Lincoln, Nebraska, and American Community Stores Corporation (ACS) is
illustrative. ACS is engaged in the grocery business and operates a number of
supermarkets in Nebraska under the name of "Hinky Dinky." In January, 1974, computer terminals belonging to First Federal were installed in two Hinky Dinky stores
in Lincoln. (The system presently employs twenty-one supermarket units. Lindsey,
supra note 1, at 5, col. 1). The First Federal-Hinky Dinky system has been au-
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recent ruling by the Comptroller of the Currency allows national banks
to establish p-o-b terminals remote from the bank without regard to state
branch banking laws. 4 By defining p-o-b terminal operations as a central
bank function and not as constituting branch banking, the Comptroller
seeks to avoid myriad problems arising from state limitations on branching
that would effectively prohibit p-o-b operation by a considerable number
of national banks. This Comment will focus on two questions raised by
the Comptroller's ruling: (1) the effect of state branching laws on the
use of p-o-b terminals by national banks assuming such terminals are
branch banks, and (2) whether p-o-b terminals are branches under the
relevant law.
EFFECT OF STATE LAW ON BRANCH BANKING

Under our "dual banking system" both federal and state governments
charter and regulate commercial banks. 5 The use of p-o-b terminals is
critically dependent upon state law since two-thirds of the nation's banks
are chartered under state authority and are therefore subject to state
thorized under 12 C.F.R. § 545.4-2 (1975) by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
(FHLBB) as a temporary, experimental project described by the FHLBB as a
"place-of-business funds transfer system."
Operation of the Hinky Dinky system is currently the subject of litigation
in both state and federal courts. In February, 1974, the Nebraska Attorney General
initiated quo warranto proceedings alleging that Hinky Dinky was illegally engaged
in the banking or building and loan business. In August, the Lancaster County District Court ruled that Hinky Dinky did not violate the state's banking or savings and
loan laws by accepting deposits for First Federal. The case is currently on appeal
to the Supreme Court of Nebraska. State ex rel. Meyer v. American Community
Stores Corp., No. 39747 (Neb., filed Aug. 23, 1974).
The other action, filed in the United States District Court in Omaha on May
28, 1974, was brought by a group of financial institutions - national banks, state
banks, and federal and state chartered savings and loan associations - and names as
defendants the supermarket chain, the FHLBB and its members, and First Federal.
This suit challenges not only the legality of the Hinky Dinky operation, but also that
of the FHLBB's regulation permitting it. Initially the plaintiffs had requested only
injunctive and regulatory relief, but under an amended complaint they now claim
damages, alleging antitrust violations by First Federal and others under the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970). Bloomfield Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n v.
American Community Stores Corp., Civil No. 74-0-146 (D. Neb., June 11, 1975).
4. 12 C.F.R. § 7.7491 (1975). National bankers, associations of bankers, or
bank regulatory officials representing fourteen states have approached the Comptroller
concerning national bank use of mechanisms that permit bank customers to electronically initiate limited banking transactions from locations remote from the bank.
39 Fed. Reg. 44416 (1974).
Prior to the Comptroller's ruling, in early 1974 the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board permitted operation of a p-o-b system on an experimental and temporary
basis, 12 C.F.R. § 545.4-2 (1975)
(see note 3 supra), while the National Credit
Union Administration has issued rules designed to achieve similar ends. 12 C.F.R.
§ 721.3 (1975).
5. See Hackley, Our Baffling Banking System, 52 VA. L. REv. 565 (1966), Part
11, 52 VA. L. REV. 771 (1966), for an excellent discussion of the U.S. banking system.
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regulation. More importantly, assuming p-o-b terminals are considered
to be branch banks, their use by national banks6 would be affected because
state law also governs the branch banking powers of national banks as a
result of section 36(c) of the National Bank Act.7
The National Bank Act
The 1927 McFadden Act" and its 1933 amendment 9 form the basis
of section 36(c) of the National Bank Act which provides:
A national banking association may, with the approval of the Comptroller of the Currency, establish and operate new branches: (1) Within
the limits of the city, town or village in which said association is
situated, if such establishment and operation are at the time expressly
authorized to State banks by the law of the State in question; and
(2) at any point within the State in which said association is situated,
if such establishment and operation are at the time authorized to State
banks by the statute law of the State in question by language specifically granting such authority affirmatively and not merely by implication or recognition, and subject to the restrictions as to location
imposed by the law of the State on State banks. 10
The meaning of section 36(c) cannot be understood without reference to
the background which summoned it into being."
Few branch banks were in existence when the National Currency Act
of 186312 and its replacement, the National Bank Act of 1864,13 were
enacted into law. It is not surprising, therefore, that neither Act contained
6. National banks are those commercial banks that are chartered by the United
States Government and are required to belong to the Federal Reserve System.
National banks also hold membership in the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation which insures deposits of all Federal Reserve member banks and such other
banks as voluntarily become insured by the Corporation. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS

262 (1963). Regulation of national banks is primarily accomplished under the authority of the National Bank Act, Act of June 20, 1874, ch. 343, 18 Stat. 123 (codified
in sections of Titles 5, 12, 18, 19, 28, and 31 of the United States Code), which is
administered by the Comptroller of the Currency, the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve Board, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. National
banks are further subject to those state laws that do not conflict with their functions
and duties as federal agencies and instrumentalities; e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Missouri,
263 U.S. 640 (1924); First Nat'l Bank v. California, 262 U.S. 366 (1923); Easton
v. Iowa, 188 U.S. 220 (1903).
7. 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1970).
8. Act of Feb. 25, 1927, ch. 191, § 7(c), 44 Stat. 1228, as amended, 12 U.S.C.
§ 36(c) (1970).
9. Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 89, § 23, 48 Stat. 189-90, as amended, 12 U.S.C.
§ 36(c) (1970).
10. 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1970).
11. See generally 37 Op. ATT'Y GEN. 325, 326-31 (1932-34); W. HURST, A LEGAL
HISTORY OF MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES 1774-1970 (1973); G. FISHER, AMERICAN
BANKING STRUCTURE (1968); B. HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA FROM
THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR (1957); Hackley, supra note 5.
12. Act of Feb. 25, 1863, ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665.
13. Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99.
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a provision dealing with branch banks. Thus, section eight of the National
Bank Act of 1864 required that banking transactions take place "at an
office or banking house located in the place specified in [the bank's]
organization certificate.'

4

By the early 1920's, state laws allowing branch banking by state banks
permitted those institutions such a distinct competitive advantage that in
some states the state banking system challenged the continued operation of
national banks. 15 Attempting to meet the threat of state competition, the
Comptroller authorized the establishment of what were then known as
"teller windows" by national banks. 16 In authorizing this expansion, the
Comptroller relied upon a 1923 opinion of the Attorney General that
absence of specific statutory branching authority would not prevent national
banks from establishing additional offices "for the transaction of business
of a routine character" such as "the receipt of deposits and the cashing of
17
checks for their customers.'
Despite the authorization, ensuing expansion of national bank facilities
was successfully challenged in First National Bank v. Missouri'8 on the
basis of illegal branch banking. The Supreme Court found that although a
national bank is an instrumentality of the federal government and thus
necessarily subject to the paramount authority of the United States, it is
also subject to the laws of the state in which it operates unless those laws
tend to interfere with the purposes of the bank's creation or tend to impair
or destroy its efficiency as a federal agency. 19 Finding that the prohibition
of branch banking by state statute neither frustrated the purpose for which
the national bank was created nor interfered with the discharge of its
duties to the federal government, the Court concluded that inasmuch as
federal law gave no authority to establish or maintain bank branches, 20
state law was competent to control the branching powers of a national
2
bank. 1
14. 13 Stat. at 102.
15. See First Nat'l Bank v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252, 257 (1966),
for a comprehensive history of the Act.
16. See 39 Fed. Reg. 44417 (1974).
17. 34 Op. ATT'Y GEN. 1 (1923).
18. 263 U.S. 640 (1924), aff'g State ex rel. Barrett v. First Nat'l Bank, 297 Mo.
397, 249 S.W. 619 (1923). Proceedings in quo warranto had been brought by the
State of Missouri to determine the authority of a national bank to establish and conduct a "branch bank" contrary to the provisions of a state statute providing "that no
bank shall maintain in this state a branch bank or receive deposits or pay checks
except in its own banking house." 263 U.S. at 655.
19. 263 U.S. at 656. See also Davis v. Elmira Savings Bank, 161 U.S. 275,
278-79 (1896).
20. "This apparently was the interpretation of Congress itself, since in two instances at least special legislation was deemed necessary to allow the establishment of
branch banks." 263 U.S. at 658.
21. The Supreme Court also found that the operation of a branch bank was not
an incidental power conferred by an act of Congress granting to national banks "all
such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking."
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Lacking express statutory authority or judicial interpretation that
would permit branching, national banks were unable to reach financial
resources available to state banks, 22 and their very existence was threatened
by the resulting imbalance. 23 One month following the Supreme Court's
decision in the Missouri case, Representative McFadden introduced a bill
that would authorize branching on the part of national banks. Passage of
the bill was urged in order to permit a workable "competitive equality"
among state and national banks. 24 Once Representative McFadden's bill
was enacted as the McFadden Act of 1927,25 national banks were permitted,
with the approval of the Comptroller of the Currency, to establish new
branches within the city, town, or village in which the bank was located
provided such establishment were permitted state banks by state law. 26
In 1932 the Senate began consideration of an amendment to the
McFadden Act which sought to permit a national bank to branch anywhere
within its own state without regard to state law, and, within fifty miles
of the parent bank, in other states as well.2 7 This proposal aroused deterId. at 659. Mr. Justice Sutherland observed that "the mere multiplication of places
where the powers of a bank may be exercised is not . . . a necessary incident of a
banking business, within the meaning of [the statute]." Id.
22. Comment, Banks and Banking - A Century-Long Conflict Between National
Banks and State Banks Over Branch Banking, 8 VILL. L. REv. 209, 212-15 (1963).
For a general discussion of branch banking prior to 1927, see BRADFORD, THE LEGAL
STATUS

OF BRANCH BANKING IN

THE UNITED STATES

1-16 (1940);

CHAPMAN

&

BRANCH BANKING 84-108 (1942); Note, Banks and Banking National Banks - Power of National Bank to Establish Branch Bank in City of
WESTERFIELD,

Location, 10 VA. L. REv. 548 (1924).
23. See 1924 COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY ANN. REP. 4; 16 J. AM. BANKERS'
ASS'N 450 (1924).
24. H.R. REP. No. 83, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1926). The policy of "competitive equality" basically requires that neither state banks nor national banks secure an
advantage over the other by means of unequal applicability of state law to their
branching rights. First Nat'l Bank v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122 (1969) ; First Nat'l
Bank v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252 (1966) ; Springfield State Bank v.
National State Bank, 459 F.2d 712 (3d Cir. 1972) ; Independent Bankers v. Camp, 357
F. Supp. 1352, 1355 (D. Ore. 1973).
25. Act of Feb. 25, 1927, ch. 191, 44 Stat. 1224.
26. 44 Stat. at 1228. Additionally, the McFadden Act also imposed for the first
time a limit on the branching powers of some state chartered banks. 39 Fed. Reg.
44417 (1974). Those state banks that were members of the Federal Reserve System
were allowed to retain existing branches, but were forbidden the establishment of new
branches "beyond the limits of the city, town, or village in which the parent bank is
situated." 44 Stat. at 1229.
Although the Act was eventually passed, it is interesting to note that there
existed an opposing alliance of those who "[did] not want any limitation placed on
the power of the states to grant branches anywhere and everywhere" with a "small
but very respectable element who [were] so adverse to branch banking or branch offices
or branch anything that they would protest against the national bank teller carrying
change across the street to a one-legged widow selling peanuts to a paralyzed cripple
on the corner." 67 CONG. REC. 2847 (1926) (remarks of Representative Stevenson).
27. S. REp. No. 584, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1932) ; 75 CONG. REC. 9891 (1932)
(remarks of Senator Glass).
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mined filibusters both in 1932 and 1933, the single outstanding objection
to the amendment being founded upon the view that it would constitute
an invasion of state sovereignty for the federal government to establish
28
within a state's borders a species of banking not sanctioned by local policy.
The opponents saw the amendment as an attempt to make the McFadden
29
into a national branch banking
Act's "national branch banking policy"
0

As a compromise Senator Bratton offered as his amendment
substantially the present section 36(c) (2),31 thereby limiting statewide
national bank branching to those states that affirmatively grant similar
branching power to state banks.
system.3

Competitive Equality
The idea that national and state banks should "compete on equal
33
32
and its
reflects the underlying purpose of the McFadden Act
terms"
34
The importance of the concept of "competitive equality"
1933 amendment.
cannot be -overstated, for this concept is the focal point of judicial con5
struction of section 36(c) and its authorization of branch banking.A Any
36
ambiguity as to the extent of federal deference to state law was resolved
28. 75 CONG. REC. 9890, 13,002 (1932); see, e.g., 76 CONG. REC. 1449, 1997, 2079,
2080, 2205, 2206 (1933).
29. 68 CONG. REc. 5816 (1927).
30. See 64 MIcH. L. REv. 155, 159 (1965). As Senator Norbeck put it, "We
have the unit bank, the American kind of bank, the bank owned and managed by the
" 75 CONG. REc. 9975 (1932). Senator Wheeler did
home folks of a community ..
"not want to permit national banks to go in there and establish branches against the
will of the people." 76 CONG. REC. 1997 (1933). And Senator Bratton maintained,
"[Ilt is easily conceivable that if we [adopt the amendment] in the course of ten
years or less three or four powerful banking institutions may control the banking
system of the country." 76 CONG. REc. 1450 (1933).
31. 76 CONG. REc. 2080 (1933).
32. 77 CONG. REc. 5896 (1933).
33. At the time of its enactment, Representative McFadden stated that "national
banks are able to meet the needs of modern industry and commerce and competitive
equality has been established." 68 CONG. REC. 5815 (1927) (emphasis added).
34. See, e.g., 77 CONG. REc. 5896 (1933) (remarks of Representative Luce, the
member of the Conference Committee who reported the bill to the House).
35. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122 (1969); First Nat'l
Bank v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252 (1966); Driscoll v. Northwestern
Nat'l Bank, 484 F.2d 173 (8th Cir. 1973); Jackson v. First Nat'l Bank, 349 F.2d 71
(5th Cir. 1965); Independent Bankers v. Camp, 357 F. Supp. 1352 (D. Ore. 1973);
Leuthold v. Camp, 273 F. Supp. 695 (D. Mont. 1967), aff'd 405 F.2d 499 (9th Cir.
1969); State Chartered Banks v. Peoples Nat'l Bank, 291 F. Supp. 180 (W.D. Wash.
1966); Hoosier State Bank v. Saxon, 248 F. Supp. 233 (N.D. Ind. 1965) ; State v.
National Bank, 219 F. Supp. 842 (D.S.D. 1963), af'd, 335 F.2d 444 (8th Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 970 (1965).
These courts dealt not only with the language of the statute, but also looked
to the purpose of Congress and the broad national policy that was evidenced by enactment of the McFadden Act.
36. The significance of this deference to state law is perhaps best illustrated by
the remarkable diversity among states in their approach to branch banking. The
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in 1966 by the Supreme Court's decision in First National Bank v. Walker
Bank & Trust Co., 37 where the Court stated:

It appears clear from this r6sum6 of the legislative history of § 36
(c) (1) and (2) that Congress intended to place national and state
following tabulation of state statutes pertaining to branch banking does not reflect
the detailed provisions of the law in certain states such as limitations that branches
be established only by merger or consolidation, geographic restrictions, restrictions
based upon the population of the location of the parent bank or of the proposed
branch, or requirements governing existing banking facilities where the branch is
sought to be established; however, these limitations or restrictions must be consulted
for "a 'branch' may be established only when, where, and how state law would
authorize a state bank to establish and operate such a branch." First Nat'l Bank v.
Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122, 130 (1969).
SUMMARY OF STATE BRANCH BANKING STATUTES

No
Legislation
Wyoming

Branching
Prohibited
Coloradoh
Florida
Illinois
KansasJ
Minnesotan
MissouriJ
Montanai
Nebraskal
Oklahoma
Texasi
West Virginiak

Branches in
Limited Areas
Permitted
Alabamaa
Arkansasa
Georgiad
Hawaii
Indianaa
Iowac
Kentucky
Louisiana
Massachusettsa
Michiganc
Mississippib
New Hampshire
New Mexicoe
New Yorkf, 1
North DakotaJ
Ohioc
Pennsylvaniae
Tennesseea
Utaha
Virginiae
Wisconsine

Statewide
Branch Banking
Permitted
Alaska
Arizona
California
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Idaho
Maine
Maryland
New Jerseyg
Nevada
North Carolina
Oregon
Puerto Rico
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Vermont
Washington

a-Permits branches within the city and county of main office.
b-Permits branches within 100 mile radius of main office.
c-Permits branches within city, county, or county contiguous to county of main office.
d-Permits offices and facilities within county of main office.
e-Permits banks to establish branches within the county or county contiguous to the county

in which the parent bank is located, or within a certain distance of the parent bank.
f-Permits banks to establish branches within the limits of the banking district in which
the parent bank is situated.
g-Permits banks to establish branches outside the state and outside the United States.
h-Permits one detached facility per bank.
i-Permits one automobile drive-in facility per bank connected to central bank building.
j-Permits only "facilities." "offices," "agencies." or "stations" for limited purposes, as
distinguished from branches.
k-One off-premises facility permitted effective May 15. 1972.
1-Statewide branching for commercial banks, savings banks, and savings and loan associations will be permitted after January 1. 1976.
CCH, FED. BANKING REP.

37. 385 U.S. 252 (1966).

3106 (1973).
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banks on a basis of "competitive equality" insofar as branch banking
was concerned.38
In Walker Bank the Comptroller of the Currency argued that if state
law permitted any type of branching, section 36(c) prohibitions were inapplicable and, therefore, national banks might establish branches in violation of specific state regulations. But Justice Clark's analysis demonstrated
the Court's acceptance of the philosophy of "competitive- equality" 39 and
the basic flaws of the Comptroller's argument:
The Comptroller argues that Utah's statute "expressly authorizes"
state banks to have branches in their home municipalities. He maintains that the restriction, in the subsequent paragraph of the statute
limiting branching solely to the taking over of an existing bank, is not
applicable to national banks. It is a strange argument that permits
one to pick and choose what portion of the law binds him. Indeed, it
would fly in the face of the legislative history not to hold that national
branch banking is limited to those states the laws of which permit it,
and even there "only to the extent that the State laws permit bank
branching." Utah clearly permits it "only40 to the extent" that the
proposed branch takes over an existing bank.
The Court concluded that even if the Utah provision were determined to
be a "method" of establishing a branch bank, it was, contrary to the
Comptroller's argument, part and parcel of Utah's policy and therefore
incorporated into sections 36(c) (1) and (2). Thus, Walker Bank makes
38. Id. at 261 (emphasis added).
39. Three years later in First Nat'l Bank v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122 (1969),
the Court reaffirmed this proposition while dealing with the related problem of the
definition of a "branch" as contained in section 36(f) of Title 12 U.S.C.:
The policy of competitive equality is therefore firmly embedded in the statutes
governing the national banking system. The mechanism of referring to state law is
simply one designed to implement that congressional intent and build into
the federal statute a self-executing provision to accommodate to changes in
state regulation.
Id. at 133.
However, it should be noted that prior to Walker Bank and Dickinson, courts
had sometimes subordinated the philosophy of competitive equality to the desire to
adhere only to federal law; see First Nat'l Bank v. Saxon, 352 F.2d 267, 271 (4th
Cir. 1965), which the Supreme Court in Walker Bank expressly found to be in
conflict with the decisions that it was affirming.
A strong argument against complete competitive equality with regard to
branch banking is presented in Comment, Federalism in Interpretation of Branch
Banking Legislation, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 148 (1964); written before the Walker
Bank decision, the author urges that federal courts adopt federal definitions of the
term "branch" based primarily upon the economic realities of banking. Even though
well documented and well reasoned, this Comment fails in its attempt to justify its
position with reference to the National Bank Act, specifically section 36(c). Compare
64 MicH. L. REv. 155 (1965), which espouses the philosophy of "competitive equality."
See also Comment, Branch Banking: The Current Controversy, 16 STAN. L. REV.
983 (1964).
40. 385 U.S. at 261 (emphasis added).
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it clear that through application of the concept of competitive equality,
all of a state's restrictions with regard to branch banking shall apply to
national banks.
In Independent Bankers v. Camp,41 the Comptroller granted the application of a national bank to open automated teller stations (ATMs) 42 in
a shopping center over the protest of the state superintendent of banking
that Oregon's branching statute did not permit the use of off-premises
automated tellers. The Comptroller argued that this interpretation of state
43
law by the state superintendent of banking was not binding upon him,
that the state law did not forbid automated tellers to state banks, and that
even if it did, national banks were not subject to the prohibition. The district court held that absent a specific Oregon statute permitting automated
branches to state banks, ATMs were not available to national banks operating within the state. The district court noted that "the proposed new
branches were not to be traditional bank offices,"' 44 and also observed that
the Oregon legislature did not contemplate automated tellers when it en45
acted the branching statutes.
After examining the state's branching statute, 46 the court indicated
that the Comptroller had to strain to fit automated tellers easily within a
traditional branching definition that made no specific mention of these
devices, while the superintendent of banking had to strain to find a statutory prohibition against their use.47 Statutory specificity in the authorization of ATM use was deemed essential by this court,48 and absent that
specificity, the court found that ATM operation was prohibited both
state and national banks, determining by implication that in this setting
41. 357 F. Supp. 1352 (lD. Ore. 1973).
42. An automated teller is a mechanism that can accept deposits, dispense cash,
or make transfers between accounts on an unattended basis. It is normally activated
by a plastic card that has customer identification and account number data magnetically
encoded on a strip on the back of the card. NEBRASKA BANKERS' AsS'N, NETS
PROJECT STUDY, EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

(1974).

43. The phrase "statute law" as used in section 36(c) (2) includes legislative
enactments only and not administrative interpretations of those enactments. Union
Savings Bank v. Saxon, 335 F.2d 718 (D.C. Cir. 1964); First Nat'l Bank v. Camp,
326 F. Supp. 541 (D.D.C. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1124 (1973). Yet the district
court in Independent Bankers did determine that a state banking superintendent's
interpretation of state law with respect to branch banking is at least entitled to
respect and consideration; however, whether the superintendent's opinion is to be
followed depends upon its conformance with the statute law of the state in question.
First Nat'l Bank v. Camp, 465 F.2d 586 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1124 (1973).
44. 357 F. Supp. at 1353.
45. Id. at 1356.
46. ORE. REV. STAT. § 714.020 (1971).
47. 357 F. Supp. at 1356.
48. "[T]he demands of 12 U.S.C. § 36(c)[(2)] are not satisfied by statutory
neutrality or inattention. Like the establishment of a branch, the operation of one is
permitted only if such operation is authorized 'affirmatively and not merely by implication or recognition' by the statute law of Oregon. . . *" Id.
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ATMs were branches. The district court concluded that it was for the
state legislature to determine whether or not such a technological innovation
should be encouraged. 49 In arriving at this conclusion, the court noted the
importance of the principle of competitive equality in those situations where,
because of statutory vagueness, the Comptroller of the Currency and the
state superintendent of banking would arrive at opposite interpretations
of the law, 50 "resulting in potentially severe competitive inequality between
state and national banks." 5' 1 Independent Bankers thus illustrates that even
in a state that permits statewide branching, a p-o-b system might not be
valid without specific state statutory authorization.
THE COMPTROLLER'S RULING AND BRANCHING DEFINED

It is against this background of federal branch banking law as it pertains to national banks that the interpretive ruling of the Comptroller of
the Currency 52 must be considered. The Comptroller's ruling seeks to
permit national banks to establish, without state branching restrictions,
electronic terminals through which an existing bank customer can initiate
transactions resulting in a crediting of funds to his account, a cash withdrawal from his account, a transfer between his checking and savings
accounts, and payment transfers from his account to those maintained by
other bank customers. The Comptroller's ruling provides in pertinent part:
7.7491 Customer-Bank Communication Terminals.
A national bank may make available for use by its customers one
or more electronic devices or machines through which the customer
may communicate to the bank a request to withdraw money either
from his account or from a previously authorized line of credit, or an
instruction to receive or transfer funds for the customer's benefit. The
device may receive or dispense cash in accordance with such a request
or instruction, subject to verification by the bank. Such devices may
be unmanned or manned by a bona fide third party under contract to
the bank. . .. Any transactions initiated by such a device shall be
49. Id. at 1356-57. Since the district court's decision, Oregon has adopted a
bill, effective January 1, 1974, permitting banks to place up to four ATMs in offpremises locations. ORE. RV.STAT. § 714 (1973). Specific legislation concerning
ATMs as applied to commercial banks has been introduced in several other states.
Massachusetts, for instance, has authorized bank use of ATMs within the county
in which its main office lies, a provision parallel to that state's branching laws,
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 167 § 65 (Cum. Supp. 1974); however, Washington, in
approving operation of the units, has attached no territorial restrictions on their use.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 30.43.020 (Supp. 1974).
50. In passing on the request of a national bank to operate a branch, the Comptroller must apply the same standards as those governing the applicable state body
in passing on the same type of question with regard to a state bank. First-Citizens
Bank & Trust Co. v. Camp, 409 F.2d 1086, 1091 (4th Cir. 1969); Clermont Nat'l
Bank v. Citizensbank Nat'l Ass'n, 329 F. Supp. 1331, 1335 (S.D. Ohio 1971).
51. 357 F. Supp. at 1357. See also Lincoln Bank & Trust Co. v. Exchange
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 383 F.2d 694, 699-700 (10th Cir. 1967).
52. 39 Fed. Reg. 44416 (1974).
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subject to verification by the bank either by direct wire transmission
or otherwise.
Use of such devices at locations other than the main office of the
bank does not constitute branch banking. A bank may provide insurance protection
under its bonding program for transactions involving
53
such devices.
By determining that the use of p-o-b systems does not constitute branch
banking, the Comptroller's ruling seeks to avoid the many and varied problems of state restrictions on branch banking that would come into play via
section 3 6(c).
Branch Banking Defined
It is clear that Congress, by section 36(c), intended to have state law
determine whether branch banking should be permitted; however, Representative McFadden's proposal was originally ambiguous in that it failed
to provide whether state law should be used to determine what constituted
"branch banking," or whether the federal courts should instead determine
whether a given activity was branch banking by application of a federal
standard or definition. The various congressional debates with regard to
section 36(c) never extended beyond consideration of the issue of the
desirability of branch banking to a direct discussion relating to the standard
by which the statutory term should be construed. Explaining the bill to
the House, Representative McFadden did make clear that it sought to
establish a national branch banking policy,5 4 and consistent with this view,
the bill was amended to provide a definition of the term "branch." Representative McFadden described the definitional section of the Act as providing that a branch is any place away from the main banking office where
the bank carries on its business of "receiving deposits, paying checks, lending money, or transacting any business carried on at the main office. ."..
Section 36(f) of the National Bank Act now provides that
[tihe term "branch" as used in this section shall be held to include
any branch bank, branch office, branch agency, additional office, or
any branch place of business located in any State or Territory of the
United States or in the District of Columbia at which deposits are
received, or checks paid, or money lent.5 6
The Supreme Court was faced with the construction
in First National Bank v. Dickinson,5 7 a case involving
that had established an armored car messenger service
construction of a stationary off-premises receptacle in a
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

12 C.F.R. § 7.7491 (1975) (emphasis added).
68 CONG. REC. 5815 (1927).
68 CONG. REc. 5816 (1927).
12U.S.C.§36(f) (1970).
396 U.S. 122 (1969).

of section 36(f)
a national bank
and had begun
shopping center
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for deposits of cash and checks, activities the bank considered beyond the
purview of branch banking restrictions. The bank had contractually arranged with its customers that funds would not be deemed deposited until
they arrived at its main office, and that checks would be deemed paid only
when the money was handed to the armored car teller at the bank rather
than at the time the customer actually received cash from the teller. The
Supreme Court held that even if a national bank contractually arranged
with its customers that funds accompanied by a deposit slip and delivered
to the bank's armored car or to a stationary off-premises receptacle should
not be deemed deposited until such funds arrived at the bank, the bank
had, for all purposes contemplated by the language of section 36(f), received a deposit at the time a customer delivered the funds to the armored
car or to the receptacle.
In discussing the contractual arrangements between bank and customer,
the Court stated:
We have no difficulty accepting the bank's argument that the debtorcreditor relationship is a creature of contract and that the parties can
agree that until monies are physically delivered to the bank no deposit
will be credited to the customer's account. We are satisfied, however,
that the contracts have no significant purpose other than to remove
the possibility that the monies received will become "deposits" in the
technical and legal sense until actually delivered to the chartered
premises of the bank. .

.

. [W]hile the contracting parties are free

to arrange their private rights and liabilities as they see fit, it does not
follow that private contractual arrangements, binding on the parties
under state law, determine the meaning of the language or the reach
58
of § 36 (f).

The Court suggested that in considering the second part of section 36(f),
it is necessary to penetrate the form of the contracts to the underlying
substance of the transaction,59 and on that basis found that the bank received a deposit upon the customer's delivery of the money, "even though
the parties . . .agreed that its technical status as a 'deposit' which may be
drawn on [was] to remain inchoate. . . .",0 Thus the Court concluded that

[s]ince the putative deposits are in fact "received" by a bank facility
apart from its chartered place of business, we are compelled, in construing § 36 (f), to view the place of delivery of the customer's cash
and checks accompanied by a deposit slip as an "additional office, or
• . .branch place of business . . .at which deposits are received."'"

In the Dickinson case the Supreme Court found that because the
purpose of the McFadden Act was to maintain competitive equality, it was
relevant to construe section 36(f) as reaching beyond a narrow consideration of contractual rights and liabilities created by the transaction, to a
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 135.
Id. at 137.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
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consideration of "all those aspects of the transaction that might give the
bank an advantage in its competition for customers." 62 In construing the
"competitive equality" concept, the Court stated:
Unquestionably, a competitive advantage accrues to a bank that provides the service of receiving money for deposit at a place away from
its main office; the convenience to the customer is unrelated to whether
the relationship of debtor68and creditor is established at the moment of
receipt or somewhat later.
The Court determined that it was unnecessary to "characterize the contracts
as a sham or subterfuge" 64 so as to conclude that the "conduct of the
parties and the nature of their relations"' 5 brought the bank's challenged
activities within the federal statutory definition of branch banking.
In Dickinson, the Court determined that "federal law alone applies
to resolve the threshold question whether [a] challenged activity falls
within the definition of 'branch.' "66 It is unclear whether the Court meant
that the definition of the term "branch" does not consider state branching
law and that section 36(f) is merely a "threshold" question that must be
determined before any concepts of competitive equality and the application
of section 36(c) to the problem may be considered, or whether it meant
that in considering a branching problem, the definition in section 36(f) is
to be compared with the activity as a "threshold" determination, and if the
activity meets the requirements of this preliminary definition, state law
restrictions on branching are then incorporated by the federal definition.
Under the concept of a federal definition which does not consider state
branching law, if the facility meets the broad functional requirements of the
62. Id. at 136-37.
63. Id. at 137. A similar case, Jackson v. First Nat'l Bank, 430 F.2d 1200
(5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 947 (1971), was decided following the Supreme
Court's decision in Dickinson. Here the operation of an armored car owned by a
subsidiary of a bank holding company was found to be an illegal branch bank. The
court indicated that although the transfer of ownership of the armored car from the
bank to the subsidiary corporation
might terminate the violation in strict form, it changes not a whit of the substance. . . . [T]he whole scheme of maintaining competitive equality between
national and State banking systems looks to substance not form ....
Id. at 1200. Ownership of the armored car, then, was not dispositive of the case for
the court determined that the transfer of ownership "did not affect the continued prohibition on the use of such trucks by the Bank to extend its area of banking operations," id. at 1201, which would "illegally disrupt the competitive equality between
federal and state banks in Georgia." Id. at 1202.
64. 396 U.S. at 137.
65. Id.
66. 396 U.S. at 133 n.7 (emphasis added). "[T]o allow the States to define the
content of the term 'branch' would make them the sole judges of their own powers.
Congress did not intend such an improbable result, as appears from the inclusion in
§ 36 of a general definition of 'branch.'" Id. at 133-34; accord, North Davis Bank
v. First Nat'l Bank, 457 F.2d 820, 823 (10th Cir. 1972) : "What constitutes a branch
of a national bank is to be determined by the definition in § 36(f), not local law."
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definition 67 provided by Congress in section 36(f) of the National Bank Act,
if the branch bank, branch office, or additional office receives deposits, pays
checks, or lends money, branching will be found and the Court will refer to
state law, under section 36(c), to determine whether the particular branching
activity is to be permitted. Since Congress saw fit to provide a federal
definition of what constitutes branch banking, it is arguable that an activity
that constitutes branching for purposes of section 36(f) in one state should
also be considered branching in another state regardless of the various
differences in each state's branching statutes.
On the other hand, an argument can be made that Dickinson actually
adopts a test more subtle than the broad functional definition provided by
section 36(f). The Supreme Court indicated that the various facets of a
transaction that give a national bank advantages in its competition for
customers are relevant in construing the term "branch." Since what might
give a national bank competitive advantages or disadvantages vis-A-vis a
state bank will ultimately depend upon those activities that are to be permitted the state bank under the laws of the state in which it operates, it
appears that state law will, in effect, refine the federal definition of what
constitutes a branch. Thus in Dickinson, it was relevant that, under state
law, a state bank would not be permitted to use armored cars to pick up
monies from its customers in determining that the national bank had
"received" a deposit away from its main office and was therefore engaged
in branch banking, even though the bank had carefully structured the transaction in order to avoid this characterization. One apparent problem with
accepting such a test is that it could result in the characterization of similar
activities as branching in one state and not in another. Conceivably, this
could be considered unsound when it is remembered that Congress did
adopt a definition of branching without any indication that the classification
of activities under this definition was to vary among the states according
to the nuances of each state's branching law. Because the definition of
branching in section 36(f) is so broad, it will make little difference which
test is employed in cases where national banks are attempting to skirt the
limitations imposed on state banks by characterizing a particular activity
as beyond the purview of the section 36(f) definition of branching.
Section 36(f) and the Comptroller's Ruling
The Supreme Court has recognized that a regulatory agency faced with
new developments may overturn past administrative rulings and practice,
67. As noted by the Court,
[a]lthough the definition may not be a model of precision, in part due to its
circular aspect, it defines the minimum content of the term "branch"; by use
of the word "include" the definition suggests a calculated indefiniteness with
respect to the outer limits of the term.
396 U.S. at 135. The Dickinson Court concluded that the term "branch bank" included, at the very least, "any place for receiving deposits or paying checks or lending
money apart from the chartered premises; it may include more." Id.
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thus permitting flexibility and adaptability to changing needs; however,
the Court has cautioned that such adaptation must fall "within the limits
of the law." s Thus, questions of statutory authority and interpretation are
for the courts, "giving appropriate weight to the judgment of those whose
special duty is to administer the questioned statute."' 9 When confronted
with a problem of statutory construction, the Supreme Court has held that
"great deference" must be granted by the courts to "the interpretations
given the statute by the officers or agency charged with its administration."70
However, although the agency's interpretation is accorded great weight,
judicial review still questions whether the administrative officer has exceeded his authority by employing means that are incompatible with con71
gressional intent in enacting the governing legislation.
Congress has committed to the Comptroller of the Currency the initial
responsibility for determining whether the conditions under which a national
bank may establish a branch are met. 72 Although the Comptroller may

have supervisory power over national banks, he cannot override a statutory
limitation -on the branch banking activity of a national bank. 73 Once the
challenged activity meets the broad federal definition of branching provided
by section 36(f), the Walker Bank decision establishes that the principle
of competitive equality calls for the incorporation of state branching restrictions into section 3 6(c). Thus, a branch may be established only when,
where, and how state law would permit a state bank to establish and op68. American Trucking Ass'n v. Atchinson, T. & S.F.R.R., 387 U.S. 397, 416
(1967). See also National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 680-82
(D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974) ; Armco Steel Corp. v. Stans,

431 F.2d 779, 788 (2d Cir. 1970); Philadelphia Television Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
359 F.2d 282, 284 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Public Service Comm'n v. FPC, 327 F.2d 893
(D.C. Cir. 1964).
69. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130-31 (1944).
70. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965); see SEC v. New England Elec.
System, 384 U.S. 176, 185 (1966) ; United States v. Drum, 368 U.S. 370, 374-76
(1962) ; NLRB v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 350 U.S. 264, 269 (1956) ; Unemployment
Compensation Comm'n v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 153-54 (1946); Gray v. Powell,
314 U.S. 402, 411-13 (1941); Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S.
125, 145-46 (1939); Housing Authority v. United States Housing Authority, 468
F.2d 1, 5-6 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 927 (1973) ; Udall v. Washington,
Va. & Md. Coach Co., 398 F.2d 765, 769 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1017
(1969); Review Comm., Venue VII v. Willey, 275 F.2d 264, 272 (8th Cir. 1960);
Peterson v. Vinal, 225 F. Supp. 478, 479-80 (D. Neb. 1964) ; Jaffee, Judicial Review:
Question of Law, 69 HARv. L. REV. 239, 261 (1955); Nathanson, Administrative
Discretion in Interpretation of Statutes, 3 VAND. L. REv. 470, 490-91 (1950).

71. 275 F.2d at 272; accord, Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 628
(1971) : "Quite obviously the Comptroller should not grant new authority to national
banks until he is satisfied that the exercise of this authority will not violate the
intent of the banking laws."
72. See note 6 supra; accord, Marion Nat'l Bank v. Saxon, 261 F. Supp. 373,
377 (N.D. Ind. 1966).
73. Suburban Trust Co. v. National Bank, 211 F. Supp. 694, 699 (D.N.J. 1962).

1975]

EFT

-

BRANCH BANKING

erate such a facility. 74 Although the Comptroller interprets section 36(f)
as not to include "customer-bank communication terminals," an examination
of judicial interpretation of the statute renders the Comptroller's interpretation suspect at best.
The principal statutory question is whether, within the meaning of
the National Bank Act, a p-o-b terminal is a
branch bank, branch office, branch agency, additional office, or . . .
branch place of business .
75
paid, or money lent.

.

. at which deposits are received, or checks

The first part of section 36(f) seems to contemplate the existence of
some sort of detached facility 76 "at which deposits are received, or checks

paid, or money lent." Although a p-o-b terminal facility may not fit
within an understanding of what might be meant by "branch bank," "branch
office," or "additional office" - terms that reasonably connote a traditional
brick-and-mortar branch banking operation - the same cannot be said so
easily with regard to an understanding of what is meant by "branch agency"
or "place of business."
Even though the present discussion is concerned with the federal
definition of "branch," it is interesting to examine state construction of the
term. Under interpretations of state laws by several state attorneys general,
the sale or issuance of bank money orders through the agency of commercial
74. First Natl Bank v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122, 130-33 (1969); North Davis
Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 457 F.2d 820, 822 (10th Cir. 1972). A subsequent change
in state law has a corresponding effect on the authority of a national bank to engage
in branching. 396 U.S. at 132; First Nat'l Bank v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385
U.S. 252, 258 (1966).
75. 12 U.S.C. § 36(f) (1970).
76. For example, the application of section 36(f) to drive-in or walk-up facilities
has been considered by the courts. In Jackson v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 F. Supp. 134
(D. Ga. 1965), the court was faced with a state statute providing that a bank could
establish either a "bank office" or a "bank facility" in addition to the parent bank. The
defendant had in fact established a parent bank as well as a bank office in close
proximity, but thereafter established a third facility some three hundred feet from
the main banking institution for the purpose of cashing checks and receiving deposits.
The establishment of this drive-in facility was enjoined, the court holding that it was
a "branch bank" within the meaning of section 36(f). In so holding, the court dismissed defendant's contention that the facility was but an expansion of an existing
facility, noting a considerable distance between the parent bank and the drive-in
facility, the number of intervening structures, and the lack of physical connection
between the main banking house and the drive-in facility. Further, since the branch
facility had an adverse effect on the balance of competition in the area, the drive-in
facility could not be considered an expansion of an existing banking institution that
would be excluded from the federal and state requirements for establishing a branch
bank. Likewise, in State Chartered Banks v. Peoples Nat'l Bank, 291 F. Supp. 180
(D. Wash. 1966), the Comptroller's approval of a similar facility was found to be
arbitrary and not in accordance with law.

104
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establishments has been found to constitute illegal branch banking."7 A
bank's use of services performed by an insurance agent to facilitate transaction of the bank's business has also been held to constitute branch banking. 78 Similarly, a bank that had arrangements with an automobile dealer
regarding bank-financed automobile loans was found to have operated a
loan production office at the dealer's place of business: "The mere fact that
such activity does not contravene the Federal . ..regulations does not mean

that the activity does not violate state law."' 79 It should be noted that with
regard to a p-o-b operation, the Comptroller determined that "[t] he [commercial] establishment is not an agent of the bank because it is acting as
it does for its own business purposes, and accordingly is a bona fide third
party" ;80 however, this characterization fails to take into account the fact
that in this operation the commercial establishment, by serving its own
business purposes or interests, is at the same time serving those of the
bank. In all of the above instances, the sales clerk, the insurance agent, and
the automobile salesman each served the mutual interests of his respective
employer and those of a bank, just as operation of a p-o-b system by a
retail employee would likewise serve both interests.
Whether considered as an "agency" or as some sort of detached
facility contemplated by section 36(f), a manned p-o-b terminal would
surely fall within the locational aspect of the definition of a "branch" for
it may be considered a "place of business" if nothing more.81 Further, while
this question was not specifically addressed in Independent Bankers, the
decision there being bottomed on section 36(c), it is implicit that the
district court determined that unmanned ATM terminals were to be viewed
as falling within the section 36(f) definition. In light of the foregoing,
then, it is doubtful that either a manned p-o-b terminal or an unmanned
automated teller machine, as putatively authorized by the Comptroller, may
escape the first portion - the locational aspect - of the branch bank
definition.
The second part of the section 36(f) definition, a location "at which
deposits are received, or checks paid, or money lent," is the key to a determination of whether the operation of a p-o-b system would constitute branch
banking under federal law.8 2 For a location to constitute a "branch bank,"
77. See 1959 CALIF. ATT'Y GEN. Op. No. 59-119, Sept. 29, 1959; 1957 MONT.
Op. No. 106, Jan. 5, 1957.
78. Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Taylor, 14 Utah 2d 370, 384 P.2d 796 (1963).
79. 1968 N.C. ATT'Y GEN. Op., Dec. 23, 1968; accord, 1960 Wisc. ATT'Y GEN. OP.,
Jan. 18, 1960.
80. 39 Fed. Reg. 44422 (1974).
81. In the Dickinson case, an off-premises deposit box or receptacle was found
a sufficient "place of business" so as to trigger application of federal/state branching
limitations. 396 U.S. at 124 et seq.
82. The Comptroller asserts that "even if a CBCT [Customer-Bank Communication Terminal] is considered to be a branch office, branch agency, or branch place
of business - it is not receiving deposits, paying checks, or making loans within the
meaning of 12 U.S.C. § 36(f)." 39 Fed. Reg. 44419 (1974).
ATT'Y GEN.
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it is not necessary that a complete banking operation be conducted, it being
sufficient if only limited banking functions are performed s3 The patent
meaning of the second part of the statute is that the challenged activity
will be considered a "branch" for purposes of section 36 if any one of the
three specified conditions is met - if deposits are received, or if checks
4
are paid, or if money is lent.8
The Comptroller characterizes the system as a communications medium
that initiates certain transactions with the bank. Stating that
[c] onsummation of these transactions by the bank for the customer
is contingent upon certain conditions being satisfied before contractual
rights and obligations attach and "deposits are received, or checks paid,
or money lent,"8 5
the Comptroller applies this conceptualization to the operation of both
unmanned automated terminals and manned p-o-b terminals as if the
determination that all transactions are actually consummated upon the adjustment of accounts within the bank's central computer is decisive in
construing the definition of branching.86
In the Dickinson case the Comptroller likewise argued that deposits
were received by the bank upon consummation of the transaction, the time
when contractual rights and obligations attached and a debtor-creditor relationship between bank and customer was effectuated;87 however, the
Supreme Court chose to disregard these internal matters, choosing instead
to examine the external aspects of the transactions in order to determine
whether the armored car or the deposit receptacle were to come within the
branch bank definition.8" Because of the doctrine of competitive equality,
the Court considered "those aspects of the transaction that might give the
bank an advantage in its competition for customers"8'

9

the decisive factor

83. Jackson v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 F. Supp. 134, 138 (M.D. Ga. 1965).
84. First Nat'l Bank v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122, 135.:(1969).
85. 39 Fed. Reg. 44421 (1974).
86. The Attorney General of Kansas came to a similar conclusion: "The business
of banking is not transacted at such terminal locations, but on the premises of the
bank wherein the transactions are electronically effected and perfected" by a bank
computer. 1974 KAN. ATT'y GEN. Op. No. 74-196, June 12, 1974. Both the Comptroller's interpretation and that of the Attorney General: of Kansas indicate that the
business of banking takes place within the central computer rather than at the
terminal location.

87. 396 U.S. at 136.
88. "[W]hile the contracting parties are free to arrange their private rights and
liabilities as they see fit, it does not follow that private contractual arrangements,
binding on the parties under state law, determine the meaning of the language or the
reach of § 36(f)." Id.
89. Id. at 136-37.
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in its determination of where, in fact, the deposits were received ;90 finding
that the deposits were actually received at a place apart from the bank's
chartered place of business, the Court was "compelled," in construing section
36(f), to view the place of delivery of the customer's cash and checks accompanied by a deposit slip as an "additional office, or . . . branch place of
business . . . at which deposits are received." 91 Unless the Supreme Court

is willing to disregard its reasoning in Dickinson and overrule that decision,
an examination of the Comptroller's determination that a "CBCT" system
does not constitute branch banking should show that operation of such a
system does indeed permit a bank a distinct competitive advantage and
that section 36(f) definitional requirements are fulfilled when deposits are
physically received at the place of delivery, a "branch place of business"
apart from the bank's chartered premises. 92
90. "Unquestionably, a competitive advantage accrues to a bank that provides
the service of receiving money for deposit at a place away from its main office; the
convenience to the customer is unrelated to whether the relationship of debtor and
creditor is established at the moment of receipt or somewhat later." Id. at 137.
91. Id. The same type of analysis was used prior to the Dickinson decision in
State Chartered Banks v. Peoples Nat'l Bank, 291 F. Supp. 180 (W.D. Wash. 1966),
where the district court considered the check cashing process and found that a check
is cashed within the meaning of section 36(f) "when the instrument is accepted
from and the money paid to the holder," 291 F. Supp. at 195, and dismissed the
remaining internal bank operations with respect to payment of the check as unrelated to a section 36(f) inquiry: "True, the remaining operations are part of the
check-cashing process, but the act of check-cashing is complete after receipt of the
check and payment of the money; and it is the act of check-cashing that is contemplated by section 36(f). Accord, Dickinson v. First Nat'l Bank, 400 F.2d 548
(1968), aff'd 396 U.S. 122 (1969).
92. The confusion engendered by sections 36(c) and (f) as well as the complex
problems raised by the federal-state dichotomy in the branching area can perhaps be
best realized through examination of a hypothetical suggested by the "Hinky Dinky"
situation (see note 3 supra). Since Nebraska is a unitary banking state, NEB. REV.
STAT. § 8-157 (1970), and a p-o-b terminal would arguably be considered a branch,
the use of p-o-b terminals by national banks in Nebraska would be illegal under section 36(c). However, in the "Hinky Dinky" case, State ex rel. Meyer v. American
Community Stores Corp., No. 285, Aug. 5, 1974 (see note 3 supra), a lower Nebraska
court indicated that banking operations were transacted inside the central computer
rather than at the grocery store location. See note 86 supra and accompanying text.
(It should be noted that the question being addressed in this case was whether the
supermarket (Hinky Dinky) was engaged in the banking or the savings and loan
business. The terminals in the supermarket were connected to a computer located
in a federal savings and loan association. Federal savings and loan associations are
not bound by statute to follow state limitations on branching, although the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board has adopted a policy of prohibiting branching by a federal
association if the state in which it operates prohibits all forms of branching. 12 C.F.R.
§ 556.5(b) (1) (1974). However, the theoretical basis of the Nebraska court's determination is still fully applicable to a consideration of the question of whether a
similar operation by a national bank would constitute branching).
Assuming that p-o-b terminals meet the section 36(f) branch definition as
Dickinson and Independent Bankers would suggest, the policy of competitive equality
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Should a commercial bank presently begin a p-o-b operation it would
plainly be an expansion of operating facilities, the very endeavor that state
branching statutes seek to regulate and control and that Congress sought
to confine via the principle of competitive equality., So long as branching
is thus restricted, all commercial banks, be they state or federally chartered,
are subject to the statutory limitations of the state in which they do business. In view of congressional deference to state regulation in this regard,
it is neither for the Comptroller nor for the courts to license an evasion of
this regulatory scheme93 by dancing a semantic foxtrot around the basic
operational and functional nature of an electronic funds transfer system of
this type.
In light of congressional and judicial reasoning, it would seem that a
national bank, relying on the Comptroller's interpretation of the branch
banking statute, would be inviting litigation by engaging in a p-o-b operation
where not specifically permitted by state law,. and in this respect, the
analogous context of the Dickinson case should serve as a warning. In that
situation, the Comptroller had issued a regulation permitting messenger
services, stating that services such as those later, employed by the First
National Bank in Plant City, Florida, were not branch bank operations and
were to be permitted upon the Comptroller's approval alone. On the basis
of the Comptroller's determination, the Florida bank instituted its armored
raises some interesting section 36(c) problems. Arguably, as the preceding paragraph
suggests, Nebraska state banks would be permitted 'p-o-b systems even though
Nebraska is a unitary banking state because the theoretical basis of the state court
decision would appear to say that p-o-b terminals are' not branches; however, if
p-o-b terminals are to be considered national bank branches under section 36(f),
section 36(c) (2) comes into play, providing that these terminals are to be permitted
only if "authorized to state banks by the statute law.of the state . . . by language
specifically granting such authority aflirmatively and not merely by implication or
recognition .. " 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (2) (1970) (emphasis added). Thus, it appears
that under section 36 (c) (2) a national bank could not utilize a statewide p-o-b system
in Nebraska, whereas a state bank may be permitted to do so in view of the state
court interpretation. In such a situation, the section that sought to permit a workable
competitive equality among state and national banks actually establishes an anomalous
competitive inequality. (It should be noted, however, that under the terms of section
36(c) (1), p-o-b terminals would be permitted within the city in which the bank's
main office is located on the basis of the lower Nebraska court's decision because this
section speaks generally of the "law of the state" rather than specifically confining
authorization to "statute law" as does section 36(c) (2)).
93. Indeed, there is substantial and respectable opinion that there should be
greater liberality in permitting the expansion of. national bank facilities; "however,
the accomplishment of this good policy should be left to the legislative branches of
the national and state governments and should not be brought about by executive fiat."
American Bank & Trust Co. v. Saxon, 373 F.2d 283, 291 (6th Cir. 1967); accord,
State Chartered Banks v. Peoples Nat'l Bank, 291 F. Supp. 180, 198 (W.D. Wash.
1966). See also Bank of Dearborn v. Saxon, 244 F. Supp. 394, 398 (E.D. Mich.
1965), where the court charged that it was not for the defendants (the Comptroller
of the Currency and a national bank) "to amend our 'antiquated' laws by clever devices of evasion. . .."
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car messenger service and soon found itself at the courthouse door. Following the Dickinson decision the Comptroller was forced to amend his reguthat such systems
lation, in order to comply with section 36, to provide
94
were to be operated only where permitted by state law.
PROPOSED BRANCHING CHANGES

Branch banking regulation is currently undergoing reexamination. 95
The best estimates are that in another ten years no state will remain without
some form of statewide, multiple office banking, 96 and this movement toward
less restricted branch banking will undoubtedly be hastened by the sophisticated electronic computer hardware that present technology has made
available.
In 1971 the United States Department of Justice submitted to the
Council of State Governments a proposal that the states reexamine their
laws limiting geographic expansion by banks, 97 a proposal based on the
broad theme that American consumers deserve greater competition within
the financial industry and that bank management and bank regulators both
deserve greater flexibility to make competitive decisions.9 8 Since the Justice
Department's proposal, the Hunt Commission has made known its recommendation that states permit both commercial banks as well as thrift institutions to expand on a' statewide basis. 99 That report states that its
94. 12 C.F.R. § 7.7490 (1974), "Messenger Service," now indicates that in some
states the power to provide such a service
may be limited by the branching provision of 12 U.S.C. 36 and the bank would
then be required to consider those aspects of the transaction which might give
the bank advantages over State chartered banks in its competition for customers.
95. More than half the state legislatures have recently considered changes in
their branching laws, changes that would cover a wide area of activity ranging from
the mere expansion of limited facilities to the significant broadening of bank branching powers. Kirby, The Name's the Thing: Financial Communications Device, Not
Automated Teller Machine, 91 BANKING LJ. 135, 139 (1974). See also Darnell,
Wider Branching Looms for: Banks, 16 MANAGEMENT DIGEST FOR SAVINGS & LOAN
EXECUTIVES 1, 2 (1973).
96. Darnell, supra note :95, at 2.

97. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, RESEARCH PAPER & POLICY STATEMENTS SUBMITTED
TO THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS (1971) ; see Baker, Bank Expansion:
Geographic Barriers, 91 BANKING L.J. 707, 711 (1974).
98. Baker, State Branch Barriers and Future Shock Tumbling Down?, 91 BAN4KING L.J. 119, 121 (1974).

99.

THE REPORT

OF THE' PRESIDENT'S

COMm'N

ON

Will the Walls Come

FINANCIAL

STRUCTURE

&

REGULATION, pt. II-C at 59-63 (1971) [hereinafter cited as HUNT COMM'N REP.].
Viewed from the vantage point of more than thirty-five years of practical experience
with the National Bank Act as amended in 1933, the Hunt Commission has submitted that "the existing regulatory system is, on balance, too restrictive," id., pt.
II-B at 43, and recommends that state legislation grant commercial banks the right
to branch statewide. Id., pL II-C at 61-62.
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recommendations are intended to introduce greater banking competition °0
and to improve the ability of financial institutions to adapt to technological
change. 10 1 While current banking laws were enacted during a period of
national financial crisis and as a consequence suffer from a lack of any wellconceived master plan, 10 2 the recent proposals for private industry reform
have been offered as "studied, non-crisis alternatives to existing regu1 03
lation.
Recognizing the future of banking operations and technology, recently
enacted Federal Deposit Insurance Act amendments10 4 call for the establishment of a twenty-six member National Commission on Electronic Fund
Transfers which is charged with conducting a thorough study and investigation in order to recommend appropriate and necessary administrative and
legislative action in connection with "possible development of public or
100. The report emphasizes that "[c]onsumers will be helped if the states, following Commission recommendations, relax branching . .. laws to permit greater competition." Id., pt. III-A at 113. The Commission recognized that in a number of
states bank branching restrictions so limit entry into local markets by financial intermediaries in the same class as well as in other classes that competition is stifled.
For example,
[iun many states, savings and loan associations and mutual savings banks have
more restrictive branching privileges than commercial banks. In a few states,
savings and loan associations have more liberal branching authority.
Id., pt. II-C at 60. The Commission sees no justification in extending different
branching rules to different institutions, especially when these institutions are otherwise competing. Id.
101. Id., pt. III-B at 117. The Commission urged the states to be progressive
in remedying their existing branching laws, warning that the failure to act might
"encourage the use of inferior organizational and technological means for extending
markets. . . ." Id., pt. II-C at 62.
102. The present system of financial regulation was "designed to limit the depressed economic conditions of the 1930's, but poorly suited to cope with the expansionary conditions of the past decade." Presidential Message to Congress, Aug. 2,
1973. See also Hearings on the Credit Crunch and Reform of Financial Institutions
Before the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., at 473
(statement of Ralph Nader) : "[T]he industry's performance is restrained by a residue of laws emanating from the Depression psychosis ....
"
103. Verkuil, Perspectives on Reform of Financial Institutions, 83 YALE L.J.
1349, 1374 (1974). Restrictive banking law is largely a product of the Depression,
and the most important banking reform of that period turned out to be the development of universal deposit insurance which succeeded in eliminating serious risks of
widespread bank failure. HUNT COMM'N REP., supra note 99, pt. II-B at 44. The
'economic premise of so much of our current banking regulation has thus been rendered obsolete to a great extent. Moreover, the entire technology on which banking
services were then based has been revolutionized by the computer. "[W]e have seen
but just the beginning, and . . . with new computer-based operations, the banking
system of the future will be entirely different from the past." Baker, supra note
98 at 122.
104. PUB. L. 93-495, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., H.R. 11221 (Oct. 28, 1974) ; 43 U.S.L.W.
127, 129-30 (Dec. 10, 1974).

MARYLAND LAW

[VoL. 35

REVIEW

private electronic fund transfer systems ....
105
Though coming at a
somewhat late stage in the development of electronic funds transfer systems,
it is some consolation that Congress appears to recognize the inherent
problems of full utilization of such systems within the confines of existing
legislation.
CONCLUSION

It cannot be overstated that law, both federal and state, should not be
the vehicle employed to restrict beneficial technology without good reason.
Decisions relating to the expansion of bank operating facilities should be
left, to a much greater extent than has previously been the case, to the
wisdom of management and the preferences of consumers. Our statutory
and case law, both state and federal, must be responsive to the changing
realities of computer technology in the banking industry.'
It has not been the intent of this analysis to suggest an indiscriminate
use of new technology in areas as vital to our economic well-being as the
commercial banking industries. Yet it is doubtful that operation of the
new electronic funds transfer systems can easily fit within existing banking
statutes and their supporting court decisions.
The time has come for the public to be permitted the full advantage
of new technology in the overly regulated banking industry, and legislators
must reexamine their own role vis-a-vis laws which were enacted or
construed before the advent of today's technological innovations, when
our manner of living was substantially less mobile and less convenience
oriented. New statutes [andi new decisions .

.

. must be carried for-

ward over the vested-interest attitudes of those who fear competition
and therefore innovation. .

.

. [I]t is outrageous for large segments

105. Among the areas this Commission is requested to take into account are
(1) the need to preserve competition among the financial institutions and
other business enterprises using such a system;
(2) the need to promote competition among financial institutions and to assure
Government regulation and involvement or participation in a system competitive with the private sector be kept to a minimum;
(3) the need to prevent unfair and discriminatory practices by any financial
institution or business enterprise using or desiring to use such a system;
(4) the need to afford maximum user and consumer convenience.
43 U.S.L.W. at 130. The Commission must make an interim report within one year
and submit a final report of its findings and recommendations not later than October
28, 1976.
106. As former Comptroller of the Currency James Saxon has recognized, it is
clear that restrictive branch banking laws show but little regard for the public interest
in that they are seemingly designed to protect the interests "of the less energetic or
competent segments of the industry which cannot abide the prospect of competition."
Comment, Branch Banking - Restrictive State Laws Considered in Light of the
Public Interest - Extension of National Power over Banking, 38 NOTRE DAME LAW.
315 (1964). It is indeed unfortunate that such laws do not presently meet the
economic needs of the people and of the banking industry, but "serve instead the determined opposition of parochial interest." Id.
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of the public to wait for the slow erosion of protectionistic
conservatism
10 7
in order to obtain benefits which already exist.
Public policy and wise administration demand that the banking industry
be subject to some minimum level of effective governmental control, but
that industry will grow more properly, and that industry will better serve
the needs of the consumer, as soon as competitive innovation rather than
standardization receives its belated but just recognition.
The continuing conflicts among state and federal bank regulatory
agencies and the politics involved in even beginning to formulate administrative or legislative proposals for implementation of new banking technology contribute to delay and, in effect, substantially permit the continuation of some of the archaic concepts and laws that are the basis of this
current banking dilemma.1 08 The computer age is well upon us and change
is necessary in order to accommodate the beneficial aspects of its new
technology.

107. Kirby, supra note 95, at 153-54.
108. Id. at 154.

ADDENDUM
[After this Comment went to press, the Comptroller issued an interpretive ruling, 40 Fed. Reg. 21700 (1975), amending 12 C.F.R. § 7.7491
(1975). This amended ruling, effective June 1, 1975, alters the original
provision allowing statewide operation of a p-d-b system by an approved
national bank by restricting installation of p-o-b terminals to within
fifty miles of
the bank's main office or closest branch, whichever is nearer, unless

such device or machine is available to be shared . . . by one or more

local (i.e., within the trade area of the device or machine) financial
institutions authorized to receive deposits, such as a co'mmercial bank, a
mutual savings bank, a savings and loan association, or a credit union.
Id. at 21704. The Comptroller also notes that when the original ruling
was issued, prominent concern was directed toward "'exclusive' or 'dedicated' terminals established and owned by a single bank and operated
principally for the benefit of its -own customers," id. at 21701, rather than
toward "networks of CBCTs owned by a third party and shared by a
number of banks or other financial institutions." Id. Thus, in addition to
the distance restriction now placed upon the use of p-o-b facilities, the
Comptroller's ruling makes clear that national banks are allowed to par-
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ticipate in a network of shared facilities, "whether or not the bank itself
owns or operates the terminals." Id.
Also after this Comment went to press, three cases relevant to the
foregoing discussion were decided. The Supreme Court of Nebraska on
May 1, 1975, decided State ex rel. Meyer v. American Community Stores
Corp., 193 Neb. 634, 228 N. W.2d 299 (1975), see notes 3 & 92 supra. The
court affirmed the opinion of the Lancaster County District Court, concluding that the installation of computer terminals in retail stores as
authorized by the FederalHome Loan Bank Board does not constitute engaging in either a banking or savings and loan business by the retail store.
The court noted the testimony of the assistant director of banking to
the effect that the Nebraska statutes would not prohibit "anyone from
acting as an agent for a savings and loan association," 228 N. W. 2d at 302,
remarking that state chartered savings and loan associations maintain
agents who "accept deposits and transmit them to the home office and
make on-the-spot withdrawals or transmit withdrawal requests to the
home office." Id. The assistant director of banking thus conceded that a
retail store such as Hinky Dinky "could act as an agent for a state chartered savings and loan association in Nebraska under current state
statutes." Id. Indeed, the court found that Hinky Dinky's activities
amounted to "acting as an intermediary and assisting in the transfer of
funds between First Federal and First Federal's depdsitors." Id. at 303.
The court made reference in dictum to the determinations of "[v] arious federal agencies having jurisdiction over financial institutions" that
p-o-b terminals manned by retail employees "may be established under
specified conditions by a financial institution under their jurisdiction,"
id., and cited the Comptroller's regulation as an example supporting the
proposition that [s]uch operations do not constitute an illegal . . . carry-

ing on of business at an unauthdrized branch by the financial institution
involved. Id. Although the court apparently accepted the Comptroller's
regulation at face value, the clear import of the court's decision is that
Hinky Dinky is serving as First Federal's agent in the operation of the
p-o-b system. While this would not necessarily constitute a violation of
federal or state statutes or regulations with regard to savings and loan
asso'ciations, see note 92 supra, such an agency relationship would constitute a violation of 12 U.S.C. § 36 prohibitions in a unitary banking state.
On June 11, 1975, the United States District Court for the District
of Nebraska entered final judgment in Bloomfield Federal Savings &
Loan Ass'n v. American Community Stores Corp., Civil No;. 74-0-146
(D. Neb., June 11, 1975); see note 3 supra. The district court entered
summary judgment in favor of defendant Federal Home Loan Bank
Board (FHLBB) and its members upon claims that the FHLBB had
adopted and amended rules and regulations "withdut authority pursuant
to § 5 of the Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933 (12 U.S.C. § 1464),"
slip op. at 2, that the FHLBB had failed to follow procedural requirements in authorizing the operation of the Hinky Dinky terminals, id.
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at 6, and that defendant First Federal Savings and Loan Association had
"made unsecured loans to Hinky Dinky . . . and/or [had] credited customers with funds not paid to it, . . . in violation of gdverning statutes and

regulations." Id. at 8.
In discussing plaintiffs' claim that the FHLBB had failed to follow
procedural requirements in authorizing the Hinky Dinky terminals, the
district court noted the crucial difference between branch auth-drization by
the Comptroller of the Currency with respect to national banks and branch
authorization by the FHLBB with respect to federal savings and loan
associations: 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) is "inapplicable to the Board's approval
of branches for federal associations," id. at 7, see note 92 supra, and it is
"[o]nly where a state has expressed an outright hostility to branching ...
will the Board not authorize 'branching.'" Slip op. at 7, see ndte 92 supra.
Further, while section 36(f) seeks to define the term "branch" applicable to national bank operations, "Congress has not defined 'branching'
in the area of federal savings and loan associations, but has left it to the
Board's discretion to determine by regulation what constitutes a 'branch.' "
Slip op. at 7. By regulation (12 C.F.R. § 545.14 (1975)), the FHLBB
has determined that a "branch" is a permanent and full-time office "at
which any business of a federal association may be transacted." Id. at 8
(emphasis in original). Noting that a p-o-b terminal permits an account
holder to transmit a funds transfer communication and that "[12 C.F.R.
§ 545.4-2 (1975)] prohibits the use of the remote service unit for ripening . . .accounts .

.

.

or for the origination, processing or approval of

any loans," id., the court then determined that a remote service unit is
merely a means of communication that permits a funds transfer "to be
effectuated on the premises of First Federal." Id.; see text accompanying
notes 85 & 86 and note 86 supra. Thus, the court concluded that p-o-b
terminals are really sui generis and are not comprehended by the FHLBB
regulations governing the establishment of branch offices by federal savings
and loan associations. Slip op. at 8.
While the United States District Court for the District of Nebraska
has concluded that operation of p-o-b terminals by a federal savings and
loan associationis not branching, the United States District Court for the
District of Colorado has reached an opposite conclusion with respect to
national banks. In State ex rel. State Banking Board v. First National
Bank, 394 F. Supp. 979 (D. Colo. 1975) the district court held that, with
respect td the function of receiving deposits, operation of an ATM by a
national bank violated 12 U.S.C. § 36, and that "to the extent that the
Comptroller's ruling permits the use of an ATM to receive deposits, it is
erroneous."3
First National had installed three ATMs, one in a shopping center
at some distance from the main bank building. Due to the restrictions on
branching in Colorado, Cold. Rev. Stat. § 11-6-101(1) (1973), see note
36 supra, the same operation would have been prohibited a state bank.
Thus the State of Colorado on the relation .df its State Banking Board and
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State Bank Commissioner challenged the operation as illegal branch banking, claiming that the Comptroller's authorization of the activity was invalid. Id. at 2.
Guided by Walker Bank and Dickinson, the court upheld plaintiff's
contention that the ATM operation was prohibited by section 36(c)
because deposit activity fell within the federal definition of branching provided by section 36(f). The court cdncluded that there was "no functional
difference between the way in which a customer makes a deposit in this
machine and the stationary receptacle for deposits which was the subject
of the decision in . . .Dickinson," id. at 8, and that "to the extent that it

performs the function of receiving deposits, this machine constitutes a
branch bank under Title 12 U.S.C. § 36(f)." Id. In dictum, the district
court also noted that the ATM was neither a place where checks were
paid nor where money was lent, id. at 9. This determination is surprising
in view of the court's treatment of the deposit transaction. The district
cdurt interpreted"check" in a technical sense and thus concluded that "[t]o
instruct the bank by depressing the keys on [the ATM] machine is not
the writing of an order for the BANK to pay upon demand." Id. The
court reached this result even though it found an "obvious similarity"
between the customer's drawing of a check and the use of an ATM to
obtain funds and even though it admitted that the results of both transactions were functionally the same. This technical treatment of the words
"'checks paid," in referring to the transaction by which funds are withdrawn from an ATM account, seems inconsistent with the nontechnical
interpretation of the deposit function. See text accompanying notes 82-92
supra. However, once the court reached the decision that the ATM was
a place where deposits were received, it was no ldnger necessary to question these other activities as the definition of branching under section
36(f) was satisfied by the conclusion with respect to deposits. See text
accompanying notes 82-84 supra.
In reaching its conclusions, the district court "followed the directions
of the Supreme Court of the United States . . .to consider the McFadden

Act by applying the literal meaning of its language to the functions of the
machine." Id. at 10. Noting that the Comptroller of the Currency had
nd authority to do otherwise, id., the court accordingly determined that
the Comptroller's interpretative ruling was erroneous to the extent that
it allowed the use of the ATM to receive deposits, and that the permission
given First National to operate the units was invalid. Id.]

